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INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Today, one quarter of Nepal’s population of twenty-seven million lives on 
a daily income of less than two dollars. Villages are deprived of an ample water 
supply, and some areas still lie in ruins from the aftermath of the Maoist 
insurgency. This paper will seek to understand the role of poverty in the historical 
and presently unfolding political environment of Nepal. Several factors show 
direct correlation between insurgent activity and measures of poverty, such as 
land ownership, level of education, and socioeconomic standing. Nepal has had a 
volatile and bloody past in the midst of medieval dynasties, an authoritative 
monarchy, and—more recently—an arguably psychotic royal family; but it is the 
nation’s state of poverty that fuels the violence, specifically the ferocity of the 
Maoist insurgency. The nation’s geography, education system, and economy 
contribute to the endemic cycle, as they are largely set up in favor of those rebel 
groups, whom the poor envy and are separated from by way of caste, and to 
whom literacy is not a foreign concept. Nepal’s violent political environment is 
not a result of its brutal history, but rather its brutal poverty. 
Nepal has been an independent kingdom for over 1,500 years. With 
Kathmandu as its current and historic epicenter for trade, business, politics, and 
culture, the Nepalese people of the Kathmandu Valley have been practicing a 
unique tradition of South Asian civilization since the fourth century.1 
Surprisingly, the religious difference—a blend of Buddhism and Hinduism—
throughout the country is not what has sparked the discord seen over the last 
decades. From the fourth to eighteenth centuries, the kingdoms of Lichabi and 
Malla held the status of overlord, but in the sixteenth century, the Gorkha worked 
to defeat each dozen of small kingdoms, leading to a united nation by the late 
eighteenth century. The nation expanded until it came to face the huge empires of 
Chinese Tibet and British India; then it stopped its expansive efforts, and fixed 
boundaries were established. By the 1850s, Nepal was in its first dictatorship 
under the Rana dynasty, from which the country revolted in 1950.2 After 
surviving several coups, Nepal was one of the few countries to have a king 
leading her into the twentieth century. 
Despite the establishment of a new constitution in 1990, Nepal has been 
afflicted with multidimensional violence in the last twenty-four years. Although 
citizens have attempted to establish legalized political parties, competitive 
elections, a constitutional monarchy, and a parliamentary democracy, Maoist 
insurgents sparked the first armed revolt in 1996, just six years after the new 
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constitution was accepted.3 After domestic killings left nine royal family members 
dead, parliament fizzled, and King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev took over all 
parts of the government in 2002.4 Maoist actions to instill fear throughout the 
insurgence resembled that of terrorism—kidnapping children, and killing leaders, 
civilians, and NGO workers. At the peak of insurgency in 2002, more than 
seventy of the seventy-five districts in Nepal were directly affected by the 
violence. During the same year, over 5,000 deaths were tallied, with a ratio of five 
government security force casualties for every one insurgent casualty. As the acts 
of violence rose in 2002, the United States Department of State added the Maoists 
to the terrorist watch list.5 
Nepal’s governmental past is one of instability and consistent change, 
never providing a basis from which the country can operate effectively. But the 
omnipresent poverty is what drives such unrest as the Maoist insurgency. People 
are most likely to join an insurgent movement when they don’t have much to 
leave behind. They can be persuaded to fight for something, even if they don’t 
know what they’re fighting for, just because they are not happy with their current 
situation. Rebel life is appealing to those who cannot see a bright future without 
the occurrence of change. Geographically, educationally, and economically, 
Nepal is fighting a battle against a deprived humanity, something that I believe 
lies at the root of the violence of the last two decades. This paper attempts to 
explore the relationship between poverty and political violence, particularly by 
examining the effects of Nepal’s geographic, educational, and economic state on 
the country’s people. 
 
GEOGRAPHY AND POVERTY 
 
Landlocked Nepal contains some of the world’s most diverse geography, 
with land ranging from flat plains just under 200 feet above sea level to mountains 
over 29,029 feet tall. In Nepal, insurgents and rebels are provided with vast, 
uncharted territory to run to when hiding from the government. These 
geographical factors make organizing and conducting an insurgency less costly 
and provide stable base camps for the Maoist armies.6 The geographical variation 
between the number of deaths that occurred between 1996 and 2006 supports the 
positive relationship between rural areas and war involvement: with three times as 
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many deaths occurring in the east as in the west.7 By defining poverty as a 
measure of accessibility to everyday materials, necessities, and foodstuffs, one 
can deduce that the more rural regions of Nepal are often the poorest. 
Historically, the marginalized peoples and families of the lower castes did 
not own land, as they did not have the means or the social capability to experience 
ownership.8 The caste system still lingers subtly today and, combined with the 
cultural doctrine of land inheritance, solidifies the fact that the groups with power 
are unchanging; indubitably provoking insurgent activity from those without land. 
Such a culturally embedded tradition raises the question: can the limited power of 
the rural communities ever be redistributed or will land ownership never become 
an opportunity for those Nepalese peoples? This “landless” stigma further 
contributes to the volatility of the nation’s unadorned, as land is to power as 
money is to power. Especially in a nation state where 85 percent of the population 
lives in rural areas, land ownership is crucial to gaining a higher socioeconomic 
status, maintaining a healthy standard of living, and having a productive 
agricultural employment.9 The lack of land ownership causes a lack of pride, 
connection, and community that makes the idea of joining the insurgency seem 
more appealing for the landless. 
There are several theories as to how poverty, geography, and insurgency 
relate to each other in a psychological and logistical perspective. First, the 
“opportunity cost view” holds to the idea that the opportunity cost of war is less in 
poorer areas due to low costs of recruiting rebels.10 Insurgent groups do not have 
to do much to get people who are not content with their lives to join them. The 
“weak state” hypothesis states that the poorer the state, the weaker the state, and 
therefore the less able to counter an insurgent movement—a largely accepted 
view. And lastly, the “grievance” hypothesis asserts that the more poverty-
stricken areas will have more grievances against the government, making them 
more willing to go fight and less willing to maintain hope in their own country’s 
authorities. Essentially, it is most likely that opposition groups will form in the 
least-developed areas of a country, as opportunity cost, strength of state, and 
grievances hold the most power and influence in these rural areas. It is through 
these avenues that poverty plays a large role in the eruption of violence in a given 
area, especially in the non-city states. 
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EDUCATION AND POVERTY 
 
The Maoists abducted over 7,787 people in May of 2004, and a large bulk 
of those abductions took place in masses at schools, with teachers, children, and 
parents taken.11 Stark empirical data such as this demonstrates the insurgents’ 
high capacity for violence and the strong influence the party had on civilians. The 
large degree of school-age abductions reflects the rebels seizing an opportunity to 
take advantage of economies of scale—large groups with little power and in small 
quarters. With such an unstable education system, it is historically evident that the 
safety of schools had not been a priority. Of course, it is natural to argue that such 
abductions were inevitable due to the size and power of the insurgence at that 
point, but the lack of security still hindered their chances of finding safety in 
chaos. The abduction of students and teachers was in a sense ironic because 
interviews with returned abductees revealed that, despite the chaos of each 
abduction and the fear the Party instilled, the students had been treated nicely, 
only led awry by being taught the Maoist beliefs and positions through teachings 
called indoctrination sessions.12 The Maoists, too, understood the power that lies 
within education. 
As does its neighbor India, Nepal has a deeply intrinsic caste system—
often formed by geography—made up of mountainous terrain dwellers, high-caste 
hill dwellers, and lower ethnic groups known as Dalits and Magars.13 The war did 
in fact lessen the significance of the caste system, and therefore cause shifts in 
resource distribution, opportunity, and power. However, with over 100 ethnic 
communities, many Nepalese citizens see the government’s recent action to 
enforce Nepali as the national language as threatening: an act of assertive power 
and symbolism of domination by the state. Others still deem the national language 
as an effort to unify each ethnic group, promote nationalism, and suppress such 
diversity.14 Education in Nepal is key to changing the remaining social stigma 
associated with non-Nepali-speaking communities. With the largest percentage of 
school dropouts belonging to historically low-caste citizens, and the largest 
portion of Maoist activists coming from the young, indigenous, and low-caste 
peoples, the debate on whether to keep or to repeal Nepali as the national 
language is becoming more and more controversial.15 Does it make sense to move 
toward nationalism and instill a prideful country? Or is repealing the decision and 
in turn honoring those who are offended a more practical solution? 
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Women’s education is essential to promote further equality and economic 
progress in Nepal. Although many women are becoming more educated today, it 
is important to note the historic and current abuse, neglect, rape, and trafficking of 
woman that still takes place throughout Nepal and its neighbors. Interestingly 
enough, the Maoist insurgency arguably sparked increased women’s involvement 
across the country, as an estimated 30 percent to 40 percent of rebels were 
women.16 This is a statistic that the Maoists pride themselves in, but it also 
prompts the question: why were women so motivated to join? Similar to their 
male counterparts, women inevitably saw the prospect of wealth and a life outside 
cultural confines as appealing. But perhaps even more so, women saw the 
insurgency as an opportunity to mitigate the gender gap, to decrease gender 
discrimination, exploitation, and prejudice. Women’s educational opportunities 
are decreasing due to the post-war economy, where the lack of jobs hinders 
university-age persons from having a positive outlook on education, and therefore 
causes a shortage of social capital. In their eyes, as well as the eyes of reformers, 
the government’s future is too unforeseeable to know if educational 
reconstruction will pay off.17 Despite the failures of Nepal’s current system, 
educational efforts are pressing forward with a new theme: a new Nepal. 
Political participation relies on knowledge of the subject. Without an 
education to provide the basis from which one can draw individual opinions and 
conclusions, those individuals do not have the capacity to take informed action 
and be politically involved in the community. Therefore, in areas where education 
is scarce and money is not a common device, there will be less opportunity for 
people to become politically involved—not only due to lack of knowledge, but 
also due to lack of time and resources. The lower classes do not have the liberty 
of taking time for political participation, and because of that they have less social 
capital. In the research of Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal, social capital and political 
participation were continually found to be the two largest players in the 
relationship between violence and insurgence in each district.18 The lack of 
economic opportunity also hinders a person’s ability to participate in politics, but 
how did socioeconomic factors contribute to the insurgency? How do they still 
contribute to chaos in the government today? 
Economic State and Poverty 
Ironically, the general economic state of Nepal gradually improved in the 
years of civil unrest from 1995–2003. It is, however, important to observe that 
during this time, rebel recruitment increased, perhaps directly relating to a larger 
difference in socioeconomic welfare.19 As the economy improved, it did not 
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translate to an increase in Nepal’s universal well-being, but instead made the 
well-off wealthier and the poor poorer. The increase in productivity in turn made 
the gap between the two classes larger, therefore enticing more of the negative 
sentiment and grievance that sparks violent conflict. Throughout the insurgency, 
the greatest Maoist expansion took place in the areas where people had most 
recently been deprived of more land, necessities, and foodstuffs as a result of the 
greater inequality formed between the classes. According to Macours’s hypothesis 
on inequality, the most salient support for insurgency comes from those who are 
most historically marginalized and do not feel as though they are benefitting from 
the economic growth like those around them are.20 
The role of remittances proves to increase prospects for violence in a 
migratory and competitive climate. In a study conducted by the World Bank in 
2006, remittances from external relatives increased from 3 percent of the GDP in 
1995 to over 15 percent at the close of 2003. The same study showed a positive 
relationship between remittances and inequality as inequality was the worst in 
areas that received the most remittances.21 While part of the world has a positive 
view of remittances, the construction is actually harming households in several 
ways. When an adult member of the household leaves, it causes a disruption in the 
family’s life—often preventing the children from attending school since they must 
fill that family member’s role at home. The lower the income, the less ability a 
household has to invest in human capital—causing the household to rely more on 
the children’s household production.22 There are, of course, positive arguments in 
support of the continuation of remittances. But, the Nepal Living Standards 
Survey of 2006 concluded that of 3,373 households, 22.5 percent receive 
remittances while only 10 percent of households send them. Remittances have 
recently become a topic of study for the United Nations due to the substantive 
relationship between remittances and women’s equality—proving a determining 
factor for one of the UN Millennium Development Goals for 2015, which aims to 
promote gender equality and women’s empowerment.23 Whether argued to be 
positive or negative, remittances play a key role in Nepal’s economy, and their 
internal usage will continue as a crucial element to the country’s future. 
Current Situation 
Headlines and international news items featuring Nepal are primarily focused on 
the one item that has the country in a gridlock: a new constitution. The country 
has been waiting on this document ever since the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement of 2006. Prior to the delay, it appeared as though all parties were 
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enthusiastic for truth, reconciliation, justice, and restitution, but after prolonging 
the delivery, new loopholes in the agreement have arisen, such as from the young 
and highly threatening Young Communist League militia.24 If the delivery had 
been done in a timely manner, it would have sealed the peace process that the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement started. Although no substantial measures have 
been taken in the field of education since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Accord in 2006, the country is recognizing the public’s demand for a more equal 
schooling system.25 The transitional era has manifested in the courage of citizens 
to stand up for direct and diverse representation—the result of a short-lived but 
attempted democracy. One prewar fact, however, remains: members of 
marginalized groups are more likely to put ethnic identity before national 
identity.26 This reality is in large part due to the numerous factions that exist, as 
well as the political challenges that must be faced even after the Constituent 
Assembly elections in November of 2013.27 
Because of the combined majority of The Nepal Congress (NC) and the 
Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML), there has been 
greater fear of a Maoist re-emergence as both they and the ethnic minorities 
challenge the majority opposition. Although the first insurgency internally 
affected Nepal, analysts predict that another insurgence would put some 
externalities at risk, such as India’s states both in the center and the eastern parts 
of the country. Despite a greater distribution of power among the parties, the 
elections placed primarily Kathmandu-based parties into power, causing further 
tension with the minority groups as their regions—and therefore their agendas, 
needs, and wants—will be largely ignored. Because the majority of seats went to 
the NC, the CPN-UML and other ethnic parties were essentially defeated. Left-
winged extremists have been taken over by right-wing forces—those who are pro-
India, pro-parliamentary system, and pro-traditional ideologies. The left side, 
however, strives for a directly elected presidential system: one person, one vote. 
While the Communist Party of Nepal is steadily diminishing in power, efforts will 
still be made to compromise a draft in order to appease the two sides.28 At this 
time, it is too much of a risk to prevent the former rebels from having an 
influence, as they continue to have mobile forces and deep intrinsic volatility as a 
group. Since a presidential system could allow too much room for Maoist 
authoritarianism, one proposed idea has been a “French system,” where there is a 
directly elected (ceremonial) president and a legislatively elected prime minister. 
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Several potential compromises have been presented in an effort to unify the 
nation, but the people have one major concern: they do not want any more 
gridlock, government stalemate, or policy paralysis—three factors that are 
difficult for every nation to ignore. Although the elections are clearly indicative of 
the nation’s desire for a strong, anti-Maoist and anti-monarchy government, 
inclusivity is key to drafting a new constitution—one that will prevent war, 
provide a system of aid, and serve as the basis of the Nepalese government for 
years to come. 
The lack of political progress threatens the public’s view, and after taking 
so long to establish some public faith in the system, citizens could easily question 
their politicians’ legitimacy.29 With that being said, much progress was made 
between 2006 and 2011: “fair” elections held in 2008; 4,000 Maoist army 
members discharged in 2010; the region declared landmine-free in 2011; and 
strides made toward healthier child-bearing situations and fewer infant deaths.30 
However, more viable problems remain. Given the nation’s past levels of 
economic productivity and the amount of young adults and education-seekers 
migrating out of the country, Nepal is underperforming. 
It does, however, have a large backing from the United Nations and other 
contributors, so why is Nepal still struggling? One problem has been the lack of 
an accurate election outcome prediction. Much to the surprise of the public and 
the rest of the world, the Maoist party won the majority of votes in the country’s 
first election and therefore took over with their own ruling leaders. After a failed 
attempt at stepping in as prime minister, former Maoist party leader Prachanda 
resigned and was replaced by Madhav Nepal, a more widely accepted and 
supported leader.31 Since then, the forming of the constitution has remained in a 
stalemate due to several factors, including human rights violation conviction and 
the size and strength of the Nepalese Army.32 The main issue is that the parties are 
too far apart ideologically to reach any sort of compromise. 
Much of Nepal’s future lies in the hands of the newly elected Prime 
Minister, Sushil Koirala. After two months of general elections and a complete 
political deadlock, the country elected the head of the centrist Nepali Congress 
Party, who received 405 votes of support and 148 votes of opposition. Although 
the country has had six heads of governments since its 2008 transition from a 
constitutional monarchy to a federal republic, there is hope that Koirala will carry 
out his promise to form a new constitution in the next year as he has the support 
of the communist UML party. There is, however, discontent among the young 
because Koirala is the fourth family member to become prime minister—arguably 
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marring the change Nepal is striving for in a modern identity. It is important to 
note that this election was the first time the Maoists and former rebels were 
defeated in the polls since the end of the insurgency. Although they are currently 
refusing to participate in drafting the charter, political analysts argue Koirala’s 
biggest challenge will be to win the Maoist’s support in the draft, as they have 
dominated the government throughout the last century and are still capable of re-
eruption. 
Although the nation has received UN Millennium Development Goals 
Committee (MDG) Awards for improvements in the maternal health field, 
politicians are currently more focused on the balance of power and all issues aside 
from the ones that are arguably the source of current public mistrust: injustice, 
inequality, poverty, and lack of opportunity.33 Poverty is a key component to 
chaos, turning people toward the radical ideologies that cause actions like the 
People’s War of insurgency. In order for the future to hold a peaceful democracy, 
Maoists will have to dismantle armies, weapons, and leadership.34 As of February 
28, 2014, Nepal has adopted a fast-track model attempting to increase the 
productivity of the Constituent Assembly.35 One month has passed since the first 
meeting of the CA on January 22, 2014, where the parties promised to have a 
written constitution within one year of forming committees. The new model aims 
to create a more efficient system, decreasing the number of committees from 
fourteen to five, writing new procedures, and calling for a first draft to be ready to 
revise within the next six months. Once the draft is complete, the committees will 
have eleven months to finalize the constitution, which must be approved by the 
soon-to-be established cross-party committee, whose goal is to prepare a report on 
related and potential constitutional issues. Nepali scholars are in agreement on 
one thing: the real importance of the new constitution is not about the government 
it puts into place, but rather about the symbolism—a new beginning for Nepal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mass poverty has prohibited the production of social capital in Nepal for 
decades, decreasing means for a good education and increasing the chances of 
political violence erupting. In conjunction with the studies of Do and Iyer, my 
research supports the idea that the reduction of poverty would likely lessen the 
chance of conflict at any given point. A reduction in poverty would cause the 
opportunity cost of recruiting rebels to be larger, and a higher quality of life could 
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mean people register fewer grievances against the government.36 Historically, a 
more stable government may have likely made a way for more stability in the 
lives of Nepalese people, but it is the state of poverty that has fed the Maoist 
insurgency and still feeds political chaos today. It can be argued that the brutality 
of the past governments is what caused the lack of resources, happiness, and 
stability, but what would these things be without Nepal’s culture and inherent 
traditions? It is a combination of the three that created the original turmoil 
throughout the country, but poverty is the fuel. It is the wood to the fiery tensions 
that run so deep, with so much volatility throughout Nepali society, and it is what 
enticed citizens to join the insurgency in the first place. 
Geography, particularly in rural areas, was found to be a recurring trend in 
the insurgence: the hillier the terrain, the more Maoist killings that occurred in 
that area. Most unidentifiable armies that were found in the mountains throughout 
the insurgency claimed Maoist membership.37 The harder your life is—not having 
little necessities readily available, prolonged hard laborious work, trekking for 
four hours to get water for your family—the more appealing seems the life of a 
rebel. It is easier to leave that which you do not wish to hold onto. Before, during, 
and even after the insurgency, Nepal’s landscape proved to be essential to Maoist 
take-over and resulting success in the government. The opportunity cost, weak 
state, and grievance hypotheses support the notions that poverty-stricken areas are 
more susceptible to insurgent action and that the war was fueled by an unhappy 
population desperate for more resources to live. In each study conducted and each 
source that I studied, geography was listed as a key factor in the extreme nature of 
the Maoist insurgency, again supporting the correlation between rural areas and 
levels of poverty throughout the country. 
From an economic perspective, education is essential to fulfill an 
expanding job market. For the last thirty-three years, the best job opportunities 
have been in the most literate districts of Nepal.38 Increased political participation 
leaves less room for insurgent outbreak, as it is a form of social capital. Whether 
it be through foreign investments or social, local capital, a nation’s investment is 
essential to its economic future; Nepal lacks proper leadership in this area as 
China and India so relentlessly try to take advantage of its weak and indefinable 
state. Emphasis is placed on the fact that greater political participation directly 
decreases violent political action, and the key to promoting greater political 
participation is increasing a person’s ability to participate, by way of time, 
knowledge, and increasing income—the reduction of poverty. One key step to 
increasing community involvement is to diminish the remains of the caste system, 
a tradition that still hinders the ability of people—women and men alike—to 
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succeed. It is noted that such deeply embedded cultural traditions can often be 
nearly impossible to reform, but that is something that will occur over time as the 
next generations move forward. Lately, the topic of a national language has been 
the most controversial throughout the nation and surrounding area, where over 
ninety-two local and ethnic languages are spoken. The ultimate goal is for citizens 
not to see the national language as a threat, but as an effort toward unification, 
nationalism, and individual pride. 
In conducting research on Nepal’s past, present, and future state—
economically, politically, and socially—I found that poverty carries terrifying 
portent, a problem that is so noticeably intrinsically and extrinsically at work in 
the world today. The reduction of poverty in Nepal is essential to reduce 
probability of another insurgence and to promote cooperation and compromise 
throughout the drafting of a new constitution. Both my research and the research 
of Nepali scholars shows that a democratic system is most beneficial for the 
evolving country, promoting the compromise that must take place between the left 
and the right, between the Maoists and the NC party, as well as the Communist 
Party and those of Marxist-Leninist persuasion in order for stability and growth to 
ensue. In a country where over 100 ethnicities make up one entity, unification of 
those parties may only be possible through democracy—a system of governing 
that would enable higher social equality and increased political participation to 
take shape. And, in a nation where such harsh economic circumstance make the 
life of a rebel seem appealing, it is crucial to take measures to reduce the level of 
poverty, eventually closing the largely divisive and defining socioeconomic gap. 
Solving the issues of national pride, historical sentiment, and caste discrimination 
is no easy task, but the future of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal is 
bright. 
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